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HISTORY MUST BE AIDED BY COMMOR SENSE 
Reading the 
Establishment Clause 
NEAL DEVlNS & BENJAMIN FEDER 
AT WOULD the Founding Fathers think of Education 
Secretary William Bennett's recent remark that "the 
fate of our democracy is intimately intertwined -
'entangled,' if you will - with the vitality of the Judeo-
Christian tradition?" Would they claim that such views im-
properly ignore the "wall of separation" that divides church 
and state . in our constitutional government? Or would they 
applaud Mr. Bennett's statement as an appropriate recognition 
of the role that religious values should play in our social 
policy? 
The answer to this question is of great significance; for the 
Supreme Court places great weight on the Founders' intent in 
determining the manner in which church and state may intera~t 
in our society. In fact, Mr. Bennett's comments were inspired 
by a series of Court rulings interpreting the constitutional 
prohibition against government establishment of religion. 
These rulings, to Mr. Bennett's chagrin, found unconstitu-
tional Alabama' s effort to encourage prayer in the public 
schools and a federally funded program that provided church 
schools serving low~income children with remedial instruction 
and secular subjects. In so ruling, the Court concluded that the 
. Founders envisioned a "high and impregnable wall" separat-
ing church and state . ' 
Whether the Founding Fathers would consider these Court 
decisions "somewhat bizarre" - as Attorney General Edwin 
Meese bluntly put it - is difficult to ascertain. 'Two sharply 
contrasting viewpoints, both adamantly purporting to rely on 
the history surrounding the framing and adoption of the Bill of 
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Rights, have emerged concerning the proper meaning, scope, 
and application of the First Amendment's Establishment 
Clause. One view (the "separationist") considers most 
church-state interaction impermissible. The other view (the 
"revisionist") conceives a wide range of church-state rei a-
Hons to be tolerated under the Constitution. 
Tne ,separationist view was characterized with Victorian 
certainty by the constitutional lawyer David Dudley Field ir 
1893: "The greatest achievement ever made in the cause of 
human progress is the total separation of church and state." In 
more practical terms, the separationist view, as summarized 
by constitutional lawyer Leo Pfeffer, is that "government may 
seek to achieve only secular ends, and in doing so may employ 
only secular means. " 
Primary support for .this view comes from the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. In fact, it was Jefferson 
who provided this view with its governing metaphor in his 
Danbury Baptist Letter of 1802: "I contemplate with 
sovereign reverence that Act of the Whole American People 
which declared that their legislature· should make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between 
church and state." (Halics added.) James Madison similarly 
observed in his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Reli-
gious Assessments that' 'We maintain therefore that in matters 
of Religion, no man 's right is abridged by the institution of 
Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its 
cognizance. " 
The Separationist view is attractive since it is an easily 
understood and easily applied principle. Additionally , Madi-
son and Jefferson were very much responsible for shaping the · 
intellectual content and structure of the eady republic. Yet the 
separationists ignore the Constitutional Congress's debates 
leading to the drafting of the First Amendment. These debates 
represent the prime source of the revisionists ' theory . 
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According to the revisionists, these congressional debates 
indicate that the Framers sought to accomplish two things 
through the Establishment Clause: first, to prevent the estab-
lishment of a national church or religion and, second , to allow 
the states , unimpeded by the federal government, to deal with 
religious institutions according to their own preferences. In 
criticizing the separationists ' reading , the historian Robert L. 
Cord notes: . 
There appears to be no historical evidence that the 
First Amendment was intended to preclude federal gov-
ernment aid to religion when it was provided on a non-
discriminatory basis . Nor does there appear to be any 
historical evidence that the First Amendment was in-
tended to provide an absolute separation or indepen-
dence of religion and the national state. The actions of 
the early Congress and presidents, in fact, suggest quite 
the opposite. 
To support this claim, revisionists point to the religion clause 
which the prototypical separationist, James Madison, had 
originally proposed: "The Civil Rights of none shall be 
abridged [by the federal government] on account of religion, 
nor shall any national religion be established." (Italics ad-
ded.) 
THE Supreme Court, for the most part, has abided by the separationist reading of the First Amendment. In the 1947 
Everson v. Board of Education decision, the Court set forth a 
reading of the Framers ' purpose that has been followed in the 
vast majority of Establishment Clause cases. Although the 
Everson Court upheld a New Jersey statute providing free bus 
transportation to parochial school students, all nine Justices 
agreed that the First Amendment's 
purpose was not to strike merely the official establish-
ment of a single sect, creed, or religion, outlawing only a 
formal relation such as had prevailed in England and 
some of the colonies. Necessarily it was' to uproot all 
such relationships. But the object was broader than 
separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was 
to create complete and permanent separation of the 
spheres of religious activity and civil authority by com-
prehensively forbidding every form of public aid or 
support for religion. . . . 
Other Establishment Clause decisions, however, evidence a 
revisionist reading of the clause. For example, in its approval 
of Pawtucket , Rhode Island's publicly funded display of the 
nativi ty scene, the Court placed great emphasis on the conten-
tion of Joseph Story (a nineteenth-century Supreme Court 
justice and early constitutional scholar) that the "real object of 
the [First] A.mendment was ... to prevent any national 
ecclesiastical establishment , which should be given to an 
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern-
ment. " The Court further noted that "an absolutist approach 
in appl ying the Establishment Clause is simplistic" in .. our 
modern , complex society , whose traditions and constitutional 
underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in 
all areas .'; 
Strict adherence to either separationist or revisionist hislOry 
leads to unacceptable results . Separationist theory. if carried to 
its logical extreme, would require the removal of .. [n God We 
Trust" from our currency, the words " under God" fn'fll our 
Pledge of Allegiance; the purchase or di splay of some of the 
great works of art at our pub!icly funded rnIlSi~ ll!l!S ; an ~ncll (J 
tax exemption for religiously affiliated institutions as wd l as 
churches; the elimination of chaplains froin the armed services 
and religion from the curriculum of our state universities . 
Strict compliance with separationist thinking would place reli-
gion at a positive disadvantage compared to secular world 
views or cultural expressions , which would be eligible for 
government exemptions and assistance. These consequences 
evidence the separationists ' insensitivity to the vital role that 
religion does and should play in our lives. 
Revisionists , by ignoring the dangers inherent in d ose 
church-state entanglement , commit similar error. Application 
of their theory would allow the states to limit puhlic funds, 
public employment opportunities , etc. to the sect of its choos-
ing without violating the Establishment Clause . In ract. only 
federal efforts to establish a national religion would be prohib-
ited by the revisionists . 
The Supreme Court has done a poor job of reconciling 
separationist and revisionis t hi story, apparently picking 
whichever interpretation best supports the des!p:d outcome . In 
fact , in its 1982-83 term , the Court proffered thlee varying 
views of history . The Court adhered to the separationist view 
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in striking down a Massachusetts statute which delegated 
certain zoning powers to schools and churches. claiming that 
"the Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter 
for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private 
choice .. . . The Framers did not set up a system of govern-
ment in which important, discretionary governmental powers . 
would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions." In 
another case, the Court took a revisionist tack in validating 
Nebraska's practice of beginning each session of its state 
legislature with a prayer by a chaplain who was paid and 
approved by the state legislature. The Court, noting that the 
Framers provided for a legislative chaplain, viewed the Ne-
braska scheme as a "tolerable acknowledgement of belief 
widely held among the people of this country . " Finally, the · 
Court adhered to neither view of history when it upheld a 
Minnesota tax dedUl.:tion scheme that permitted parents of 
public and private schoolchildren to deduct tuition and other 
educational expenses . Instead, the Court concluded that "at 
this point in the t\venticth century we are quite far removed 
from the dangers that prompted the Framers to include the 
Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights." 
THAT THE Court is unable to conform to a single view of history highlights the unworkable consequences of strict 
adherence to either separationist or revisionist theory. The 
simple solution to this problem is that more attention should be 
focused on the contemporary setting of whatever government 
program is at issue. 
In other words, "what the Founding Fathers meant ," while 
helpful. is an inadequate basis for keeping the Constitution 
alivc and relevant to circumstances that arise two hundred 
years after its language was written; the Constitution is an 
ever-changing document: necessarily applied to evolving cir-
cumstances in a flexible - but not quixotic - way . 
This perception - that the Constitution is a living document 
- is hardly a new idea . In 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall 
contended that the Constitution was "intended to endure for 
ages to come and, consequently. to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs." In 1820, Marshall similarly char-
acterized the Constitution as "designed to approach immortal-
ity as nearly as human institutions can approach it." Today . 
thc Constitution has been interpreted as provi?ing for a right of 
privacy guaranteeing, in tum. the right to chOose aii aboriion; a 
right to equal protection under the laws which ensures a free 
education to illegal aliens; and a right to due process of 1<1 ... , 
which prohibits a public school from suspending a student 
without a hearing. Although there are good reasons why One 
might disagree with any or several of those deCisions , the 
Court was correct in placing the Framers' intent in a contempo_ 
rary seuing. 
Constitutional interpretation must respond to contemporary 
needs . In a complex society. governmental and religious or-
ganizations inevitably impinge upon one another in a myriad 
of ways. Many of these interactions arise from the reality that. 
as organizations. churches and their affiliates own property. 
retain paid employees. receive and disburse funds, and avail 
themselves of various municipal services . Hence, religious 
institutions are inevitably engaged in activities administered, 
paid for . or regulated by governmental agencies at various 
levels. Even exempting them from governmental involve-
ments that other organizations have. brings involvements of its 
own, if only in the form of establishing definitions, criteria, 
and procedures whereby government can be satisfied that they 
are bona fide religious organizations and thus are entitled to 
such exemptions. Put simply: the systematic exclusion of any 
official reference to. or entanglement with, religion assumes 
nothing less than the thorough-going secularization of society. 
These unavoidable entanglements also suggest that the Su-
preme Court was in grave error in prohibiting the states from : 
providing remedial instruction to disadvantaged private school 
students. providing nonideological materials (maps, globes. 
charts) to private schools, permitting parents of low-income 
private schoolchildren to deduct from their taxable income a 
percentage of school tuition costs. or providing bus transporta-
tion for field trips of private schoolchildren. These (and sev-
eral other) decisions ignored the valuable secular educational 
function provided by private schools. even - heaven forbid 
- church-affiliated ones. 
Recognition of the vital role played by church-affiliated 
organizations should not result in judicial approval of all 
government programs which benefit religion. For example, 
government support of one particular kind of religious belief 
was the principal evil which the Establishment Clause sought 
to forestall. It follows that publicly funded displays of the cross 
or the nativity scene are examples of non-permissible govern-
ment support of such religious belief. Just as governmental 
recognition of either our religious heritage or the valuable 
secular functions performed by church-affiliated schools. hos-
pitals. and social welfare organizations seems proper. even 
laudable. governmental validation of majority preferences in 
religion sacrifices that diversity of thought and belief endemic 
to our republic. 
This common sense approach to church-state interaction 
avoids the doctrinaire and unworkable use of history which 
characterizes both the separationist and revisionist viewpoints . 
The principle of religious liberty. which is essential to the 
Establishment Clause, requires a drawing of a fine Ii ne. not the 
building of 3 brick wall . or no wall at all. 
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